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NON-COMPETITION AGREEMENTS AND RESEARCH
PRODUCTIVITY IN THE BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY
Joseph E. Coombs, Texas A&M University
Porcher Taylor, University of Richmond

ABSTRACT
This paper examines the impact of the state-level legal structure, namely the legal support for noncompetition agreements, on research productivity. Specifically, we study how California’s unique lack of
non-competition agreement laws influences product develop when controlling for local munificence and
firm-level technological capability. Our results indicate that California’s unique legal structure is
negatively associated with research productivity as measured by the number of products in development
at the time a biotechnology firm goes public. Further, firm size moderates this relationship such that the
effect is stronger for smaller biotechnology firms.
INTRODUCTION
For decades, economists have recognized that firms in the same industry tend to cluster
geographically. This observation has lead to a stream of research called agglomeration economics. At the
core of agglomeration economics is the argument that firms benefit by locating within a geographic center
of production. Transportation costs, proximity of raw materials, and access to a labor force with unique
skills are examples of benefits accruing to firms because of clustering and are factors thought to explain
the agglomeration of firms (Acs, FitzRoy & Smith, 1999). Krugman (1991a, b) and Marshall (1920)
suggested that three major factors foster the creation of industry clusters: a pooled market for specialized
labor, the development of specialized intermediate goods industries, and knowledge spillovers.
Knowledge spillovers are defined as the benefits of knowledge to individuals or firms not responsible for
the original creation of the knowledge (Almeida & Kogut, 1999). Knowledge consists of information and
know-how (Kogut & Zander, 1992). Self-reinforcing expertise (Arthur, 1990) is a second model of
regional development. In this conceptualization, geographic variance in technical progress is argued to
exist because regions with innovative activity develop specialized resources critical to the next phase of
innovation. Recently, Stuart and Sorenson (2003) provided evidence supporting the role of social capital
as a creator of industry clusters. Lastly, Saxenian (1994) provided evidence that a culture of employee
mobility supports cluster development. In each of these perspectives, knowledge spillovers play a
particularly important role as they create competitive advantages for the firms located in the region
through the relatively unimpeded flow of tacit knowledge. Findings that the level of relevant activity
occurring within the firm’s geographic location complements its ongoing research (Zucker, Darby &
Brewer, 1998b), increases its ability to develop new products (Deeds, DeCarolis & Coombs, 1999), and
makes the firm more attractive to investors (DeCarolis & Deeds, 1999) (all critical outcomes for
technology ventures) support the assertion that knowledge spillovers are especially important factors in
industry cluster development. This literature, while highly informative and helpful in explaining why
firms are located within a cluster, does little to explain geographically where clustering occurs or how the
place where clustering occurs influences firm performance. In this paper, we provide one possible
explanation, legal infrastructure, for why firms cluster where they do and test three hypotheses relating
legal infrastructure to research performance.
Recent research by Gilson (1999) has examined the role legal infrastructure might play in facilitating
the creation of a high technology agglomeration economy. Gilson posited that knowledge is transferred
between firms by high employee movement, thus generating continuing innovation. He hypothesized that
Silicon Valley’s culture was shaped by the underlying legal infrastructure and particularly the state law
barring enforcement of employee non-competition agreements in California. A non-competition
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agreement is defined here as an employee’s contractual promise not to engage in business similar to the
employer’s and not to work for an employer’s competitor (Gabel & Mansfield, 2003) for a particular
period of time (usually one or two years) and within a specific geographic region (Gilson, 1999). Many
companies use employee non-competition agreements to manifest that management owns human capital.
This is especially true in high technology industries where much of a firm’s competitive advantage is in
the form of tacit knowledge that is developed over time through hands-on experience and interactions
with other researchers, customers, and suppliers (Gilson, 1999; Zucker, Darby & Armstrong, 1998a).
From the employer’s perspective, they have an obvious competitive interest in protecting this tacit
knowledge and in keeping it from spilling over to competitors (Gilson, 1999). California is the only state
in the nation where these agreements are void on public policy grounds (Gabel & Mansfield, 2003;
Gilson, 1999; Kovach, Pruett, Samuels & Duvall, 2004).
If Gilson is correct, then we might expect differences in the enforceability of employee noncompetition agreements to lead to differences in the “relative successes” of high technology-based
geographic economies. Wood (2000) tested this relationship by comparing the law regarding covenants
not to compete in four high technology centers: Silicon Valley, the Route 128 Corridor in Boston, Austin,
Texas, and Research Triangle Park in North Carolina. Significantly, employee non-competition
agreements are not banned in Massachusetts, Texas or North Carolina. In Massachusetts, courts generally
favor enforcement of such agreements. Although the courts in Texas are reluctant to enforce these
covenants, Texas “technically” can enforce them. North Carolina’s “counter-balancing” peculiarities
create a favorable enforcement environment for these agreements. Wood used various economic and
financial data to objectively examine the relative recent successes or failures of the four regions, but did
not find correlation between high technology success in these clusters and the degree to which these four
states enforce employee covenants not to compete (2000). Despite significant legal infrastructure
differences between the regions, they all seemed to be experiencing exponential growth and success.
Non-Competition Covenants and Research Productivity
While much has been made of the importance of employee migration as a catalyst for entrepreneurial
activity (Almeida & Kogut, 1999; Audretsch & Lehmann, 2005; Saxenian, 1994) and knowledge transfer
(Almeida & Kogut, 1999; Rosenkopf & Almeida, 2003; Song, Almeida & Wu, 2003), relatively little
mention has been made of the tacit knowledge loss firms sustain when employees leave. According to the
resource-based view of the firm (Barney, 1991; Conner, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984), firms differ in their
stocks of resources, resource heterogeneity has a strong influence on performance differentials, and those
resources that are valuable and rare, such as tacit knowledge, are associated with superior performance
(Berman, Down & Hill, 2002). Resource based scholars suggest that socially complex tacit knowledge,
due to its inimitable and non-codifiable nature, is a source of competitive advantage that can sustained for
a period of time (Barney, 1991; Kogut & Zander, 1993; Lippman & Rumelt, 1982; Reed & DeFillippi,
1990; Teece, 1982; Teece & Pisano, 1998). It is precisely because tacit knowledge cannot be sold through
a market mechanism but instead resides in an individual or group, that it is the basis for sustained
competitive advantage.
While tacit knowledge may be viewed as a source of sustainable competitive advantage, how this
knowledge comes into being is unclear. Dierickx and Cool (1989) suggest that resources are stocks of
assets that have accumulated over time. Berman and colleagues (2002) suggest then that tacit knowledge
accumulates over time and with experience. For firm, this suggests that it is advantageous to keep
employees as they are a firm’s primary source of tacit knowledge. In other words, if employees leave
frequently firms are disadvantaged in two ways. First, the employee takes with them any the tacit
knowledge they have. Second, firms cannot immediately replace this tacit knowledge because it only
develops over time. Even if the firm hires an employee to replace the one lost, it will take some time to
develop the group level tacit knowledge that was lost when the employee left. In California, where noncompetition agreements are not enforced, employees may and do leave firms regularly, often to start new
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firm of their own (Gilson, 1999). While this may positively influence start-up activity in California, we
suggest that it is negatively related to firms’ research productivity. Thus:
H1: Being located in California is negatively associated with research productivity.
Moderating Role of Firm Age
The effect of state-level legal structure on research productivity is particularly strong for younger and
smaller firms because these firms have not typically developed the qualities associated with legitimate
firms (Stuart, 2000; Stuart et al., 1999). Empirically, researchers have shown that a firm’s early years of
existence are the most tenuous in terms of survival (Henderson, 1999) due to the liability of newness.
(Bruderl & Schussler, 1990; Freeman, Carroll & Hannan, 1983; Singh, Tucker & House, 1986). Young
firms are more likely to fail because they must divert scarce resources away from operations to attract and
train employees, develop routines and develop credible relationships. Further, these firms are more likely
to be concerned with resolving important strategic issues such as determining which opportunities to
pursue, selecting a competitive strategy, choosing methods of strategy implementation, and establishing
strategic control mechanisms (Stinchcombe, 1965) for the first time. At the same time, managers in newer
organizations are less likely to engage in formal strategic planning or thorough environmental scanning.
As a result, they may have less knowledge of external environmental factors, when compared with
executives of older organizations. This is largely due to a lack of managerial and analytical resources
available to younger firms (Boeker & Goodstein, 1993). It is noteworthy when young firms are able to
maintain operations while also building internal resource and forming credible exchange relationships.
Due to the lack of routines and strategic planning as well as the limited time the firm has had to develop
tacit knowledge, we suggest that younger firms are more likely to be negatively impacted by the legal
structure in California relative to non-competition agreements than are more established firms. Thus, we
hypothesize that the relationship between legal structure and research productivity is influenced by firm
age.
H2: Firm age moderates the relationship between being located in California and research
productivity such that the relationship is more negative for younger firms.
Moderating Role of Firm Size
Similar to younger firms, smaller firms have also been shown to operate at a relative disadvantage
(Aldrich & Auster, 1986). Comparatively little is known about the quality and future performance of
small firms (Stuart, 2000). External actors such as customers, suppliers, employees, investors, and
research partners tend to prefer interacting with larger established firms because the reliability and ability
of larger firms is well known (Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Stinchcombe, 1965; Stuart, 2000). As with
young firms, it is noteworthy when small firms are able to maintain operations while also building
internal resource and forming credible exchange relationships. Small firms, therefore, typically lack these
capabilities and may have limited resources with which to develop tacit knowledge. We therefore
hypothesize that the relationship between legal structure and research productivity is influenced by firm
size.

H3: Firm age moderates the relationship between being located in California and research
productivity such that the relationship is more negative for smaller firms.
METHOD
Sample
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Because they (1) may suffer from the liabilities of newness and smallness, (2) have difficulty
establishing their legitimacy, and (3) must manage relationships with needed external resources to reduce
their uncertainty, we chose to study biotechnology firms to test the hypothesized relationships. In slightly
different words, we believe that the biotechnology industry provides an appropriate milieu for the study of
the relationships among state-level legal structure and research productivity. The primary reason for this
is that firms in this industry are relatively young with minimal resources required to support costly and
highly uncertain product development efforts.
Our target sample was the population of human therapeutic biotechnology firms that went public
between 1982 and 1999. Each firm that went public prior to 1996 was identified using Bioscan. Each firm
was contacted and a prospectus describing its initial public offering (IPO) of stock was requested.
Prospectuses for those firms that went public after 1995 were identified using Bioscan and recap.com and
were collected from Edgar, the Securities and Exchange Commission’s publicly available database. One
hundred and eighty seven prospectuses were collected. Due to missing data or the inclusion of warrants in
a parent firm, twenty firms were excluded from the data set, yielding a final data set of 167 firms.
We collected data from each firm’s prospectus for its initial public offering of stock and from Ernst &
Young’s annual reports on the biotechnology industry. To test for potential biases in the sample collected
prior to 1996, we compared the average total assets and total liabilities as reported by Burrill and Lee
(1993) for the population of public biotechnology firms. The firms in our sample that went public prior to
1996 had an average of $11,708,000 in total assets and $3,569,000 in total liabilities. Burrill and Lee
(1993) reported the average total assets and total liabilities for all 225 public biotechnology firms in 1992
as $11,377,000 and $3,313,000 respectively. Based on this comparison of total assets and total liabilities,
the sample of firms included in this study that went public prior to 1995 is not significantly different from
the population of publicly traded biotechnology companies prior to 1995. In addition, by selecting firms
from a single industry, we controlled for potential industry effects (Dess, Ireland & Hitt, 1990).
Dependent Variable
Research productivity is a count variable representing a limited range of positive integer variables
including multiple zero values, and is not normally distributed. Ordinary least squares regression
techniques are inappropriate for this type of data. Poisson and negative binomial regression handle this
type of data well. The presence of overdispersion in this type of data supports the use of negative
binomial regression while the lack of overdispersion favors poisson regression (Hausman, Hall, &
Griliches, 1984; Welbourne & Trevor, 2000). Comparing the likelihood ratios of the two models at one
degree of freedom indicates that the poisson model is appropriate for our data (Cameron & Trevedi, 1986;
Welbourne & Trevor, 2000). The prospectus of each firm lists those products in clinical trials and those
that have been approved for sale. The measure we used included products in pre-clinical trials, those in
formal FDA clinical trials, and those approved for sale. This measure is thus the most comprehensive
measure of research productivity as applied to products available. Multiple applications of the same
product were not included.
Independent Variable
The state-level legal structure examined in this study is the legal support for employee noncompetition agreements. As a matter of law, California is the only state in the United States that does not
recognize the legality of employee non-competition agreements. The remaining 49 states vary with the
degree to which courts support these agreements, however, in general these remaining state courts do
recognize these agreements as legal (Gilson, 1999). Our independent variable then is a dichotomous
variable where 1 is coded as the firm is headquartered in California and 0 if the firm is headquartered
elsewhere.
Control Variables
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We considered including a number of control variables. Based on the literature, we chose to control for
firm size and age, scientific competency, alliance activity, firm location, firm location squared, and
research connectedness. Firm age is defined as the age of the firm in years from founding to the firm’s
IPO. Age serves as a proxy for uncertainty because younger firms have had limited time to develop tacit
knowledge (Stuart, Hoang & Hybels, 1999). Following Deeds, Mang and Frandsen (2004), the number of
employees is used to control for the effect of firm size on research productivity. Patents are considered
indicators of important technology positions and innovative activity and can also be considered as inputs
in the new product development process (Mansfield, 1977; Pakes, 1985). From the offering firm’s
prospectus, a count of the patents both granted directly to the firm and patents in which the firm is the
sole licensee is taken. A raw count of patents provides a reasonable alternative to a quality adjusted
measure of patents by citations since prior research has shown that a firm’s raw patent count is highly
correlated with the quality of its patents (Stuart, 2000). Moreover, in the biotechnology industry, patent
counts as a proxy for innovativeness may actually be preferred over patent citation measures since
citations occur over time and thus, are biased towards older patents. Firm R&D represents both
knowledge that is available only to the organization that produced it and knowledge accrued from
spillovers from R&D expenditures other firms in the same or related industries have made (Acs &
Audretsch, 1989; Jaffe, 1986; Ziegler, 1985). R&D intensity is measured as R&D expenditures during the
year prior to each firm’s IPO as a percentage of total firm expenditures (Deeds et al., 1997). Traditionally,
R&D intensity is measured as R&D expenditures as a percentage of sales (Hansen & Hill, 1991).
However, given the early stage of development of the firms in this industry, and their lack of revenues,
total expenditures are used in place of sales. Data were collected from firm prospectuses. Recent research
has investigated the role of alliances in knowledge transfer (Inkpen, 2001; Mowery, Oxley & Silverman,
1996; Powell, Koput & Smith-Doerr, 1996) and has noted that alliances may be appropriate conduits for
the transfer and development of knowledge (Hagedoorn & Narula, 1996) especially when firms are
geographically proximate (Rosenkopf & Almeida, 2003). We control for this potential source of
knowledge transfer by including the total number of alliances each firm has been involved in from
founding to IPO as listed in the prospectus.
A firm location factor was developed based on prior research (DeCarolis & Deeds, 1999; Zucker et al.,
1998b) to capture a number of location measures important to biotechnology firms’ research productivity.
The factor included the following variables: Department Rank, Medical Schools, Venture Capital, and
Biotech Firms. Department rank is coded as the number of universities with top quality biotech-relevant
departments in each firm’s SMA during the year the firm went public. The data for this variable come
from two National Research Council surveys (completed in 1982 and 1993) of doctorate granting science
departments. The sample was split into those firms going public up to and including 1988 and those firms
going public after 1988. Thus, we used the survey results that were reported closest to the year of each
firm’s IPO. We also analyzed the data using only the 1982 survey and then analyzed the data using only
the 1993 survey. The department rank variable’s results were not significantly altered using either data
source. This variable is coded as the number of universities within each firm’s SMA that is rated at 4.0 or
higher in at least one biotech-relevant department in a given year. Medical schools is coded as the number
of top ten medical schools in each firm’s SMA. Data were collected from annual issues of the Gourman
Report. Venture capital is coded as the number of venture capital firms in each biotechnology firm’s
SMA having a stated industry preference in biotechnology as reported in annual issues of Pratt’s Guide to
Venture Capital. The biotech firm variable equals the percentage of the total industry’s biotechnology
firms located in each biotechnology firm’s SMA. This data was collected from Ernst & Young’s annual
reports on the biotechnology industry.
The connectedness measure was adopted from Cockburn and Henderson’s (1998) work. Publication
information was collected for each firm for the period from firm incorporation to the IPO date. Publications
included those indexed in the Institute for Scientific Information’s Science Citation Index. Consistent with
Cockburn and Henderson (1998), authors’ mailing addresses were used to identify institutions involved in
collaborations. Multiple addresses from the same institution were collapsed into one instance of
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collaboration. For example, a record with three authors and two Harvard University addresses was classified
as one instance of university collaboration. The connectedness measure was developed by first classifying
each publication’s addresses into one of the following classes: self, university, NIH, public, private,
nonprofit, hospital, and unclassified. Self refers to papers where only addresses of the focal firm (or its
divisions and subsidiaries) are listed. University includes university and medical school addresses. NIH
includes any NIH or affiliated (e.g., National Institute on Aging) addresses. Public addresses include
those associated with National Laboratories, Departments of Public Health, and other government
departments. The hospital category includes hospitals, clinics, and community health centers. Nonprofit
addresses are those associated with research centers and institutes, foundations, and other non-profit but
not government affiliated offices. The private category includes for-profit private organizations such as
pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms. Unclassified includes any organization we were unable to
classify. This data set included two unclassified addresses, each of which was an individual’s private
address. For the purposes of this study, each classification was divided into its local (at the SMA level),
domestic non-local, and international components. Thus, the measures used in this research represent firm
connectedness at the local, domestic, and international levels.
RESULTS
The average firm in our sample had 3.28 products, was 6.18 years old, and had 87.70 employees. Our
firms were located in SMAs with an average location factor score of 0.00. For comparison, firms in our
sample located in San Francisco, Boston, Atlanta, and Philadelphia had average location factor scores of
8.24, 4.68, -3.83, and –1.44, respectively. The average location squared score was 13.11. The average
firm in our sample had 6.70 patents, spent 66% of their expenditures on R&D activities, and had been
involved in 5.34 alliances. Firms in the sample had an average of 4.14 local connections.
Table 1 presents the results of the poisson regression analyses with research productivity as the
dependent variable. Three different models were run. Model 1 presents the base case controlling for firm
age, firm size, patents, R&D intensity, total alliances, firm location, location squared, and local
connectedness. The results indicate that firm size is negatively associated with research productivity (p<.01).
The results also show that patents held by the firm (p<.01), location (p<.05), and local connectedness
(p<.001) were all positively associated with research productivity. Location squared was negative and
significant (p<.001). The second model incorporates the state-level legal structure variable (California). As
predicted in hypothesis 1, California was negatively and significantly (p<.001) associated with research
productivity. Thus, hypothesis one was supported. Hypotheses 2 and 3 were tested in Model 3 by
introducing the interactions between California and firm age as well as California and firm size. The
interaction of California and firm age, although in the predicted direction, was not significant and thus failed
to support hypothesis 2. Lastly, the interaction between California and firm size was examined. The
interaction is negative and significant (p<.05) and therefore provides support for hypothesis 3. The main
effects for California remained negative and significant (p<.001) when the interaction terms were added to
the regression equation. Our results are consistent with prior findings of a non-linear relationship between
the amount of activity in a local area and a firm’s research productivity. In reviewing the results, we find
strong support for both Hypotheses 1 and 3, but no support for Hypotheses 2. This indicates that state-level
legal structure has a significant impact on firm-level research productivity by providing firms outside of
California a means to protect the tacit knowledge held by their employees. Our results also indicate that
firms in clusters and firms connected to their local scientific community through article co-authorship are
significantly more research productive.
DISCUSSION
Schumpeter (1942) observed the importance of understanding conditions that create opportunities for,
support, or impede entrepreneurial activity. For economies, understanding these conditions is an important
policy issue while for individual firms, having this understanding is critical to efforts to achieve competitive
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success. Our results shed light on these important issues by contributing to the burgeoning stream of
research on firm-level research productivity.
Building on prior legal research (Gabel & Mansfield, 2003; Gilson, 1999; Kovach et al., 2004; Wood,
2000), we argued that state-level legal structure relating to employee non-competition agreements would
impact firm-level research productivity by either allowing employees to leave firms with no restrictions on
their post-employment activities or by restricting employee actions during a period of time and/or within a
geographic region. Our results suggest that the legal structure in California that places no restrictions on
post-employment activities hinders firm’s research and development activities. We believe this occurs
because firms cannot protect the tacit knowledge held by employees. We also considered the issues of
whether legal structure was more important to younger and smaller firms. Our results here suggest that
smaller firms are particularly affected by the legal structure in California. The results clearly highlight the
importance of legal structure when firms are particularly reliant upon competitive advantages based upon
tacit knowledge. We also provided support for prior research that has shown a non-linear relationship
between firm location munificence and firm performance. Firm location is positively associated with
research productivity up to a point. At that point, the increased competition for resources negatively impacts
a firm’s research and product development efforts. We also support prior research by Zucker and Darby
(1998a) and Cockburn and Henderson (1998) that suggests the importance of being connected to local
knowledge sources rather than simply waiting for knowledge to spill over from other firms.
While highlighting the influence state-level legal structure has on research productivity, this study’s
results are limited by a focus on the biotechnology industry. While there are methodological advantages to
studying a single industry (Dess et al., 1990), the results must be viewed conservatively. We also use a
limited number of variables in our location construct. Other variables such as biotechnology employment
would be welcome additions to the measure. Finding this data at the SMA level, however, has proved
difficult. Lastly, there are certainly other ways to keep employees from leaving and taking their tacit
knowledge with them including compensation structure and job design. Ideally, these could be controlled
for but, again, data availability is problematic.
Finally, we would like to add some suggestions for future research. In this paper we do not control
for other state-level legal issues that may have a bearing on employee migration. Our focus here is on
research productivity. Future research may be directed at relating legal structure to other performance
measure such as survival, time to IPO, and patent development. For entrepreneurs, this research suggests
that state-level legal issues should be considered when deciding where to locate their firms if knowledge
protection is central to competitive advantage.
CONTACT: Joseph E. Coombs; Mays Business School, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX
77843-4221; (T): 804-287-6631; (F): 804-289-8878; jcoombs@tamu.edu.
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Table 1
Poisson Regression Results for Research Productivity
Variables
Firm Age
Firm Size
Patents
R&D Intensity
Total Alliances
Location
Location Squared
Local Connectedness
California
California x Age
California x Size
Pearson Ch-Square
Log Likelihood
N
†

Model 1
-0.013
-0.003**
0.007**
-0.107
-0.014
0.029*
-0.024***
0.021***

Model 2
-0.018
-0.003**
0.007**
-0.126
-0.016†
0.033*
-0.014*
0.021***
-0.174***

755.73
138.96
167

669.83
158.87
161

Model 3
-0.017
-0.002*
0.006**
-0.127
-0.015†
0.030*
-0.014*
0.022***
-0.216***
-0.007
-0.002*
653.19
161.64
159

p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

Posted at Digital Knowledge at Babson
http://digitalknowledge.babson.edu/fer/vol26/iss14/1

10

